The
last article argued that real issues, policies and personalities had
begun to gain traction in elections in Fiji by the 1980s. The 1982
elections clearly showed that by centralizing its 82-page manifesto,
the NFP had mounted a credible challenge against the Alliance Party.
It is anybody’s guess what would have happened had Reddy removed
the Fijians historically “clubbed and ate their way to power”
phrase from the Four
Corners Australian
TV program.
What
happened instead was that the fateful phrase was seized on and
twisted by Alliance strategists to stoke the flimsily-buried race
card. Fijian fears of Indian domination and subjugation in their own
country once again became the prime concern that drove voting. All
other concerns became unimportant. One other issue emerged - foreign
involvement. The significance of this would only become clear later.
Immediately
after the 1982 elections fiery anti-Indian speeches were made in both
houses of parliament – how dare the greedy, unappreciative Indians
challenge for political leadership in a country where they were
essentially visitors living on the goodwill of their hosts. This was
followed by a landmark GCC meeting in Bau, which was incidentally
opened by Queen Elizabeth II. There, the racial diatribe reached a
crescendo.
It
was clear that the Alliance leadership (and the chiefly system) were
rattled and no longer sure of their hold on power. This panic was
clearly seen when Mara alleged in Australia that Reddy had received
$1m for the 1982 elections from the Soviet Union who were desperately
trying to establish a foothold in the South Pacific. This was never
proven. Then he castigated Indian High Commissioner Sonu Kochar for
attending NFP functions; the woman had to leave.
Clearly
the Alliance panicked, the writing was on the wall and talks began to
emerge again of a government of national unity. Political immaturity
prevented this from materializing. On the macro front the country was
mired in a prolonged recession and the Mara government started
implementing necessary, but unpopular economic policies. One of
these, the 1985 wage freeze, led to the formation of the Fiji Labour
Party by Fiji’s main labour unions on 6th July 1985.
This
new phenomenon - the multi-racial Fiji Labour Party - entered the
political scene on a non-ethnic, issues-based political platform. For
the first time, Fiji had a political party that did not champion
race. Its victory-focused coalition with the Indian-dominated
National Federation Party diluted this somewhat, but the writing was
on the wall. On the other hand, Fijian unity had continued to fray
within an outdating chiefly system as Butadroka pranced on his
anti-Mara platform.
The
rapidly-increasing number of urban and educated Fijians had begun to
make new demands and look outside the traditional Fijian system for
political support. Western Fiji had begun to question the hegemony of
the Eastern chiefs. The old yasayasa
va Ra
sentiment was rekindled. These were the people who had never been
subjugated by the colonizers and their local cohorts who were largely
from the East.
Moreover,
the latent voice of Fijian dissent – dating back to Apolosi Nawai,
Viti Cauravou, Ravuama Vunivalu, Apisai Tora, Ratu Mosese Tuisawau,
Ratu Osea Gavidi, etc – had reached the point of eruption. In other
words, the traditional Fijian system could no longer guarantee a
unified Fijian vote under the once-stout chiefly umbrella.
Once-taboo
Fijian topics and institutions were suddenly being questioned openly
by Fijians linked to the Labour Party. The NLTB was being dissected
in public, chiefs were criticized, Mara’s link with the Marela
House made waves, a Land Commission was mooted, a single identity for
all Fiji’s people was bandied around, etc. Suddenly nothing Fijian
was sacrosanct. This was unprecedented and the Alliance made as much
of it as possible.
More
significantly, a common political platform had also begun to emerge
among the working-classes in response to shared hardships emanating
from the stagnant economy and a number of natural disasters. This
heralded the arrival of a non-ethnic political platform in the
country that up till then could only envisage politics through the
ethnic lens. The urban Fijian voter would hound Fiji’s ethnic-based
Fijian political parties well into the future.
As
the 1987 elections neared, Mara again centralized the Cold War and
looked overseas for support. His links with the US through its Suva
embassy and the East-West Centre in Hawaii had begun to look
desperate – the significance of this would only become clear years
later in discussions on the 1987 coup. Alliance rule was under real
threat and no amount of Red diversions was going to save it.
The
signals were all there. For the first time a coalition was presenting
to the electorate a non-ethnic mantra. I remember on a January 1987
trip to Lautoka by taxi, I was the only Indian with 3 other
passengers and the driver. Someone bought a newspaper in Sigatoka
with the headline, “Mara …..”. There was no “Ratu” before
the name. This led to a heated discussion about disrespect, greedy
foreigners, the need to save Fiji, etc. No one knew that I understood
every word spoken and was feigning sleep.
Four
months later Dr. Bavadra did the impossible and toppled the Alliance.
Another month after that, Fiji was bequeathed with its first coup.
People who thought like my fellow passengers on that ride to Lautoka
danced with glee while the country hemorrhaged. A new phenomenon had
entered the political equation – might is right.
The
coup spectre would dog all future governments henceforth. Mara’s,
and the Fijian chiefly system’s, hold on the Fijian polity was
broken. More factions and demands emerged unfettered. What would this
mean for the future of Fiji, its political system, its people, etc.
was anyone’s guess at that juncture.
Next,
we will look at the aftermath of the 1987 coup and the making of the
1990 constitution. Keep tuned.
Subhash
Appana is an academic and political commentator. The opinions
contained in this article are entirely his and not necessarily shared
by any organizations he may be associated with both in Fiji and
abroad. Email appanas@hotmail.com
Sent:
21/9/12
2 comments:
Subash you say "the fateful phrase was seized on and twisted by Alliance strategists to stoke the flimsily-buried race card'. Your logic is as strained as your badly mixed metaphor.
The phrase was not the NFPs but the ABC's. The NFP's role was to exhibit a video of the show all around the country, thereby very delibarately endorsing the gratuitous insult to all Fijians. The Alliance's work had been done for them by the NFP. There was no need to 'stoke the buried race card'.
How could the NFP win Fijian votes if this was the level of their understanding of Fijian sentiment. Jai Ram Reddy, no racist to be sure, made a serious mistake here. This misjudgement has to go into the bin with all the other might-have-beens of our history, including, of course, what might have been if NFP leaders had supported Ratu Mara when he faced Butadroka and nationalists on one flank. Butadroka was the enmy of all, not just the Alliance and Ratu Mara.
The old idea that my enemies enemy is my friend has done a lot of damage in Fiji, including in 2006 when all of Qarase's political rivals supported a man who will not hesitate to sell out all Indo-Fijians when it suits him. in fact, the way he tossed away EU aid to the sugar industry means that he's already done that.
I agree that the NFP made a big-time strategic blunder; they should've known better. On the other hand, the Alliance did pounce on it and go on a major offensive to ensure that the race bogey delivered its promise of electoral success once again. The voting system in place at the time was not going to allow broad-based political platforms.
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