■ Cogito, ergo sum. I think, therefore I am. (René Descartes, mathematician and philosopher,1599-1650)
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts
Showing posts with label China. Show all posts

Sunday, 13 October 2019

China Group Leases Solomon Islands Provincial Capital


Tulagi highlighted . pn521
Central  Province has agreed to lease on long term the whole island of Tulagi to Chinese firm China Sam Enterprise Group Ltd to be developed into a “Special Economic Zone”.
Premier Stanley Manetiva signed the agreement with Sam Group reps in Honiara last month.
The agreement also mentioned lease of islands surrounding Tulagi to the Chinese firm.
Sam Group prides itself as one of China’s top hi-tech investors.

Sunday, 12 May 2019

China Tweaks its Belt and Road Initiative to Avoid Further Backlash

Most Pacific Islands now have diplomatic relations with mainland China and many have signed up for the Belt and Road Initiative which, while providing much needed  and very considerable help with infrastructure, also raises questions about repayment and indebtedness that can be used —as can all aid assistance—to advance the political and economic interests of the donor. -- ACW

pn382
 China Tweaks its Belt and Road Initiative to Avoid Further Backlash  by 
    Alex He and Anton Malkin*

In his speech at the recent Belt and Road Forum, Chinese President Xi Jinping underlined that the next phase of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) will “adopt widely accepted rules and standards,” “follow general international rules and standards in project development, operation, procurement and tendering and bidding” and “ensure the commercial and fiscal sustainability of all projects.”

Sunday, 21 April 2019

Climate Change and the Collapse of the American "World Order". China Solar Energy in Space


Cataclysm and Collapse
pn359
...  there is mounting evidence that climate change, as it accelerates, is creating the basis for the sort of cataclysm that will be capable of shaking even such a deeply rooted (American) world order . The cascading effects of global warming will be ever more evident, not in the distant future of 2100 (as once thought), but within just 20 years, impacting the lives of most adults alive today.
Last October, scientists with the U.N.’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change issued a “doomsday report,” warning that humanity had just 12 years left to cut carbon emissions by a striking 45% or the world’s temperature would rise by at least 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels by about 2040.  This, in turn, would bring significant coastal flooding, ever more intense storms, fierce drought, wildfires, and heat waves with damage that might add up to as much as $54 trillion — well over half the current size of the global economy. Within a few decades after that, global warming would, absent heroic measures, reach a dangerous 2 degrees Celsius, with even more devastation.
In January, scientists, using new data from sophisticated floating sensors,reported that the world’s oceans were heating 40% faster than estimated only five years earlier, unleashing powerful storms with frequent coastal flooding. Sooner or later, sea levels might rise by a full foot thanks to nothing but the thermal expansion of existing waters. Simultaneous reports showed that the rise in world air temperature has already made the last five years the hottest in recorded history, bringing ever more powerful hurricanes and raging wildfires to the United States with damages totaling $306 billion in 2017. And that hefty sum should be considered just the most modest of down payments on what’s to come.
Surprisingly fast-melting ice sheets in Greenland and the Antarctic will only intensify the impact of climate change. An anticipated rise in sea level of eight inches by 2050 could double coastal flooding in tropical latitudes — with devastating impacts on millions of people in low-lying Bangladesh and the mega-cities of southeastern Asia from Mumbai to Saigon and Guangzhou. Meltwater from Greenland is also disrupting the North Atlantic’s “overturning circulation” that regulates the region’s climate and is destined to produce yet more extreme weather events. Meanwhile, Antarctic meltwater will trap warm water under the surface, accelerating the break-up of the West Antarctic ice shelf and contributing to a rise in ocean levels that could hit 20 inches by 2100.
In sum, an ever-escalating tempo of climate change over the coming decades is likely to produce massive damage to the infrastructure that sustains human life. Seven hundred years later, humanity could be facing another catastrophe on the scale of the Black Death, one that might, once again, set the world in motion.
The geopolitical impact of climate change may be felt most immediately in the Mediterranean basin, home to 466 million people, where temperatures in 2016 had already reached 1.3 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels.  (The current global average was still around 0.85 degrees.)  This means that the threat of devastating drought is going to be brought to a historically dry region bordered by sprawling deserts in North Africa and the Middle East. In a telling example of how climate catastrophe can erase an entire world order, around 1200 BC the eastern Mediterranean suffered a protracted drought that “caused crop failures, dearth, and famine,” sweeping away Late Bronze Age civilizations like the Greek Mycenaean cities, the Hittite empire, and the New Kingdom in Egypt.
From 2007 to 2010, ongoing global warming caused the “worst three-year drought” in Syria’s recorded history — precipitating unrest marked by “massive agricultural failures” that drove 1.5 million people into city slums and, next, by a devastating civil war that, starting in 2011, forced five million refugees to flee that country. As more than a million migrants, led by 350,000 Syrians, poured into Europe in 2015, the European Union (EU) plunged into political crisis.  Anti-immigrant parties soon gained in popularity and power across the continent while Britain voted for its own chaotic Brexit.
Projecting the Middle East’s history, ancient and modern, into the near future, the ingredients for a regional crisis with serious global ramifications are clearly present. Just last month, the U.S. National Intelligence Council warned that “climate hazards,” such as “heat waves [and] droughts,” were increasing “social unrest, migration, and interstate tension in countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Jordan.”
If we translate those sparse words into a future scenario, sometime before 2040 when average global warming is likely to reach that dangerous 1.5 degrees Celsius mark, the Middle East will likely experience a disastrous temperature rise of 2.3 degrees. Such intense heat will produce protracted droughts far worse than the one that destroyed those Bronze Age civilizations, potentially devastating agriculture and sparking water wars among the nations that share the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, while sending yet more millions of refugees fleeing toward Europe. Under such unprecedented pressure, far-right parties might take power across the continent and the EU could rupture as every nation seals its borders. NATO, suffering a “severe crisis” since the Trump years, might simply implode, creating a strategic vacuum that finally allows Russia to seize Ukraine and the Baltic states.
As tensions rise on both sides of the Atlantic, the U.N. could be paralyzed by a great-power deadlock in the Security Council as well as growing recriminations over the role of its High Commissioner for Refugees. Pummeled by these and similar crises from other climate-change hot spots, the international cooperation that lay at the heart of Washington’s world order for the past 90 years would simply wither, leaving a legacy even less visible than that block of the Berlin Wall in midtown Manhattan.
What you have read is an extract. To read the whole article, CLICK HERE


China aims to build solar energy plant in space
By Semi Turaga
Tuesday 05/03/2019


China says it is working to develop a solar energy plant in space that could one day beam enough power back to Earth to light up an entire city.
If scientists can overcome the formidable technical challenges, the project would help combat the Earth's addiction to dirty power sources which worsen air pollution and global warming.
China has already pledged to invest $US367 billion in renewable power generation solar, wind, hydro and nuclear by 2020.

China hopes to be operating a commercially viable solar space station by 2050.

Saturday, 1 December 2018

Pacific Leaders More Questioning of Chinese Influence

Radio New Zealand     -     24 Nov 18
By Michael Walsh
Papua New Guinea's capital Port Moresby was a sea of red in the lead up to the APEC summit - Chinese flags dotted major roads, and the face of China's powerful president-for-life was pasted high on billboards.
no caption
pn183

President of China Xi Jinping arrives at APEC in Port Moresby. Photo: AFP / Pool / Eyepress

Saturday, 27 October 2018

China and the Rape of Solomon Islands Forests

Click on this site (not the photo) to see a most incredibly damning video.
Do not click here. pn143

■ The Solomon Islands is China’s second-biggest source of tropical logs (after Papua New Guinea), despite the fact that the Solomon Islands are only twice as big as Beijing. 


■ The Solomon Islands exported more than 3 million cubic metres of logs in 2017, more than 19 times a conservative estimate of the annual sustainable harvest. 

Thursday, 25 October 2018

Pacific Islands Weekly 24 October: Fiji, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Israel, NZ, China, Japan

pn146
Taxi owner supports FijiFirst. The owner of one of Fiji’s largest fleet of taxis has  vowed to use its vehicles to help the FijiFirst party in its campaign. Tiko Kece base owner Ratu Lomaca Baleilevuka said the reason was that the Government had assisted them with the issuing of taxi permits. Hum!!

Dr Wadan Narsey, in my opinion, rightly,   questions a situation where Board members of Fiji's largest financial entity, the Fiji  National Provident Fund, are all appointed by Government, which is also the largest borrower from the fund (about $2B.) Worker representation was abolished in 2014. (This suggests insufficient safeguards. -Ed.)

Ro Filipe for death penalty. Chiefly SODELPA candidate

Wednesday, 29 August 2018

China's aid to the Pacific in some sort of perspective

____________________________________________________________________
A NEW FEATURE. SEE 'SNIPPETS/BREAKING NEWS' IN THE SIDEBAR
____________________________________________________________________

One perception Pn46
The Pacific region is making headlines across Australia after Pacific and International Development Minister Concetta Fierravanti-Wells harshly criticised Chinese aid in the region. 'Useless' is how Fierravanti-Wells has described Chinese aid projects, leading countries to take on debt they can't afford. While her concerns are legitimate, her blunt delivery hasn't been constructive and has led to some considerable political and diplomatic fallout.

Aid to the Pacific Islands

Total
$US (m)
%
China
%
Loan
%
Aust.
%
NZ
%
Other

Pop

GDP
PNG
4475
14.1
90
76.8
3.9
5.2
7.3M
15.4B
Vanuatu
1030
23.7
84
39.1
11.8
25.3
266K
798M
Fiji
921
39.1
89
32.9
5
23.2
881K
4B
FSM
1058
3.9
0
2.3
-
93.9
104K
333M
Samoa
809
28.4
75
30
15.1
26.5
190K
793M
Tonga
590
29.2
77
30.8
17.8
22.2
104K
473M
Cook Is.
175
28.6
58
17.1
49.7
4.6
13K
295M
Based on: Lowy Institute https://chineseaidmap.lowyinstitute.org/ figures for 2015. FSM Federated States of Micronesia. Aid figures rounded up. % Other: EU Institutions, France, Japan, USA. 'Loan'- low interest concessional loans from China, remaining percentage grants and cash. Solomon Islands recognizes Taiwan.It receives no aid from  the CPR. Niue not included. Calculated by Croz Walsh.
Author Jonathan Pryke, Director 
 Lowy Institute's Pacific Islands Program
The Pacific region is making headlines across Australia after Pacific and International Development Minister Concetta Fierravanti-Wells harshly criticised Chinese aid in the region. 'Useless' is how Fierravanti-Wells has described Chinese aid projects, leading countries to take on debt they can't afford. While her concerns are legitimate, her blunt delivery hasn't been constructive and has led to some considerable political and diplomatic fallout.
So what's the real story? Is Chinese aid in the Pacific useless?
The answer is not so simple. China's aid program is so opaque it is very difficult to understand exactly what it is doing. China does not conform to the sophisticated reporting and accountability mechanisms that traditional Western donors have developed over decades of aid delivery. According to some estimates, China announced more than US$350 billion in aid between 2000 and 2014 under a shroud of secrecy, leading to considerable anxiety about where, why and how Chinese aid is given.
This anxiety extends to the Pacific, where since 2006 China has rapidly expanded both its commercial ties and aid program. The Lowy Institute has invested considerable time to better understand China's engagement. Our map of Chinese aid in the Pacific shows projects committed from 2006 to the middle of 2016. By scouring budget documents from countries across the Pacific, Chinese government websites, secondary sources such as conventional and social media, and conducting numerous interviews, we have compiled the most comprehensive picture of China's involvement in the region. It is not perfect, but it identifies and quantifies Chinese aid better than any other source.
Our research shows Chinese aid in the Pacific has grown substantially, with China committing more than US$1.7 billion in aid to eight Pacific Island countries (including Timor-Leste). To put this into context, total traditional aid to these countries over the same period was over US$9 billion, with aid from Australia making up almost two-thirds this amount.
President Xi Jinping
An important distinction must be drawn between Chinese projects and traditional ones. China typically engages in large infrastructure projects by providing low interest, or 'concessional', loans that eventually have to be repaid. There is often scant information beyond an announcement, with no detail on the terms of these loans or repayment schedule. Australia and other traditional donors typically provide one-way grants that do not need to be paid back and engage in more complex (albeit far from perfect) forms of assistance across multiple sectors, from humanitarian assistance to governance support.
To illustrate this point, while we have identified 216 Chinese aid projects in the Pacific from 2006, there have been more than 5000 projects carried out by traditional donors since only 2011. While Chinese numbers may appear large, it involves a concentration into select large projects. Because of this distinction, comparing Chinese aid to Australia's is like comparing apples and oranges. China has emerged as a significant donor, yet is it clearly still not the biggest player in the Pacific.
Understanding the quantum of Chinese aid is only the starting point. The greater challenge is understanding quality, the point that has landed Fierravanti-Wells in strife. Such judgments are not black and white, and ultimately projects have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The best research on this, looking at the experience of four countries in the region, has found that effectiveness of China's aid to be mixed; projects in Samoa have largely led to positive outcomes, while the experience in Tonga and Vanuatu has been less positive.
Importantly, the authors find that the quality of Chinese aid projects are 'dependent in large part on the actions of Pacific Island governments'. This shouldn't come as a surprise. China is not forcing aid on these countries; the Pacific governments have to tell China what they want and manage the projects to a standard that ensures China delivers. With these findings in mind, a criticism of Chinese aid is also an implicit criticism of the governments in the region that agreed to the projects in the first place.
The point Fierravanti-Wells makes about debt distress is a fair one. The International Monetary Fund has noted that Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu all face considerable debt repayment pressures, and all have significant debt to China. Xi Jinping has even acknowledged the debt burden in the past, promising forgiveness that has yet to eventuate. There are also cautionary tales elsewhere in the world of China taking advantage of debt-distressed nations. Considering the portfolio of loans in Pacific countries (think government buildings and conference facilities, rather than critical infrastructure projects such as deep-sea ports or airports), this seems less of a problem, though certainly worth keeping a close eye on. But again, much of this responsibility must rest with Pacific governments. Australia can't criticise China without criticising decision-makers in the Pacific as well.
Given this messy context, the statements by Fierravanti-Wells, while not without basis, have not been constructive. Attacking the new kid on the block is the easy way out, and Australia is a far from perfect player in the region. The government should instead be working harder to encourage the role of Chinese aid in the Pacific, acknowledging it as an important complement to Australia's aid. China's continuing attention on the region should also be a catalyst for Australians to take a hard look at themselves and ask how they can do more in the immediate region and work with all actors towards a more prosperous Pacific.
The Pacific region is making headlines across Australia after Pacific and International Development Minister Concetta Fierravanti-Wells harshly criticised Chinese aid in the region. 'Useless' is how Fierravanti-Wells has described Chinese aid projects, leading countries to take on debt they can't afford. While her concerns are legitimate, her blunt delivery hasn't been constructive and has led to some considerable political and diplomatic fallout.
So what's the real story? Is Chinese aid in the Pacific useless?
The answer is not so simple. China's aid program is so opaque it is very difficult to understand exactly what it is doing. China does not conform to the sophisticated reporting and accountability mechanisms that traditional Western donors have developed over decades of aid delivery. According to some estimates, China announced more than US$350 billion in aid between 2000 and 2014 under a shroud of secrecy, leading to considerable anxiety about where, why and how Chinese aid is given.
This anxiety extends to the Pacific, where since 2006 China has rapidly expanded both its commercial ties and aid program. The Lowy Institute has invested considerable time to better understand China's engagement. Our map of Chinese aid in the Pacific shows projects committed from 2006 to the middle of 2016. By scouring budget documents from countries across the Pacific, Chinese government websites, secondary sources such as conventional and social media, and conducting numerous interviews, we have compiled the most comprehensive picture of China's involvement in the region. It is not perfect, but it identifies and quantifies Chinese aid better than any other source.
Our research shows Chinese aid in the Pacific has grown substantially, with China committing more than US$1.7 billion in aid to eight Pacific Island countries (including Timor-Leste). To put this into context, total traditional aid to these countries over the same period was over US$9 billion, with aid from Australia making up almost two-thirds this amount.
An important distinction must be drawn between Chinese projects and traditional ones. China typically engages in large infrastructure projects by providing low interest, or 'concessional', loans that eventually have to be repaid. There is often scant information beyond an announcement, with no detail on the terms of these loans or repayment schedule. Australia and other traditional donors typically provide one-way grants that do not need to be paid back and engage in more complex (albeit far from perfect) forms of assistance across multiple sectors, from humanitarian assistance to governance support.
To illustrate this point, while we have identified 216 Chinese aid projects in the Pacific from 2006, there have been more than 5000 projects carried out by traditional donors since only 2011. While Chinese numbers may appear large, it involves a concentration into select large projects. Because of this distinction, comparing Chinese aid to Australia's is like comparing apples and oranges. China has emerged as a significant donor, yet is it clearly still not the biggest player in the Pacific.
Understanding the quantum of Chinese aid is only the starting point. The greater challenge is understanding quality, the point that has landed Fierravanti-Wells in strife. Such judgments are not black and white, and ultimately projects have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The best research on this, looking at the experience of four countries in the region, has found that effectiveness of China's aid to be mixed; projects in Samoa have largely led to positive outcomes, while the experience in Tonga and Vanuatu has been less positive.
Importantly, the authors find that the quality of Chinese aid projects are 'dependent in large part on the actions of Pacific Island governments'. This shouldn't come as a surprise. China is not forcing aid on these countries; the Pacific governments have to tell China what they want and manage the projects to a standard that ensures China delivers. With these findings in mind, a criticism of Chinese aid is also an implicit criticism of the governments in the region that agreed to the projects in the first place.
The point Fierravanti-Wells makes about debt distress is a fair one. The International Monetary Fund has noted that Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu all face considerable debt repayment pressures, and all have significant debt to China. Xi Jinping has even acknowledged the debt burden in the past, promising forgiveness that has yet to eventuate. There are also cautionary tales elsewhere in the world of China taking advantage of debt-distressed nations. Considering the portfolio of loans in Pacific countries (think government buildings and conference facilities, rather than critical infrastructure projects such as deep-sea ports or airports), this seems less of a problem, though certainly worth keeping a close eye on. But again, much of this responsibility must rest with Pacific governments. Australia can't criticise China without criticising decision-makers in the Pacific as well.
Given this messy context, the statements by Fierravanti-Wells, while not without basis, have not been constructive. Attacking the new kid on the block is the easy way out, and Australia is a far from perfect player in the region. The government should instead be working harder to encourage the role of Chinese aid in the Pacific, acknowledging it as an important complement to Australia's aid. China's continuing attention on the region should also be a catalyst for Australians to take a hard look at themselves and ask how they can do more in the immediate region and work with all actors towards a more prosperous Pacific.
-- Jonathan Pryke in The Interpreter, 11 Jan. 2018

See also 
West accused of trying to spread discord over Chinese aid'


Sunday, 26 August 2018

"West Getting China Wrong"


Pn51
Occasionally, we'll publish on issues that originate outside our normal NZ-Pacific area, especially when they shed light on our main interests. This article by William Overholt, a senior fellow at Harvard University, is one of them. It is based on his book "China's Crisis of Success".

           ***

The dominant narrative in the West reads that China has a stable administration run by a ‘president for life’ who is the most powerful leader since Mao Zedong. 

China has escaped the pressures for political change that transformed earlier Asian miracle economies at similar levels of development. It has consolidated a particularly repressive market Leninism, which is destined to grow rapidly for the indefinite future. And its increasingly centralised economic control and ambitious industrial policies are so efficient that they constitute an unlimited threat to the West.

These arguments are wrong. 

China has not escaped the pressures of political complexity that forced political reform elsewhere. Rather, those pressures are so powerful that the whole structure of Xi Jinping’s administration is a reaction to those pressures.

Around 2005 China’s leadership became fearful that the country was pulling apart. Economic reform lagged. Powerful interest groups were taking control of policy. Local governments were disobedient. Ministries defied the premier. Corrupt generals weakened the military. Corruption was undermining Party legitimacy. These forces are powerful: China’s obstreperous provinces and interest groups are often larger than European countries.

Apprehensive about emergent crisis, China’s leaders designed a new economic plan based on market allocation of resources combined with a desperate centralisation of government. To facilitate decision making, the top leadership would have seven leaders rather than nine and would exclude “extreme” opinions (pseudo-Maoist Bo Xilai and reformist Li Yuanchao). Key policy areas would be controlled by small leading groups, including a new National Security Council, all chaired by a single leader. Unlike his predecessor, the new leader would command the military immediately. These decisions were made by workable consensus separate from the selection of Xi Jinping. 

Contrary to the Washington meme, Xi is not a Putin. Xi is a creature of the Party. Putin’s party is a creature of Putin.
Xi was allocated power along with a difficult reform assignment. Market allocation of resources would damage the power and finances of every major power group: state enterprises, banks, the Party, the government, the military and local governments. Xi’s instrument for dislodging reform opponents — the anti-corruption campaign — not only alienates the leaders of all those sectors but also leaves officials frightened to implement reforms.

So determined was the opposition, that supporters hoped — best case — that Xi would spend his first term consolidating power and his second implementing reforms.

Certainly Xi’s first term was spent consolidating his position. Ferocious opposition (summarised by a leading executive as ‘you die or I die’) stimulated fears of personal retribution and reform reversal after Xi’s second term, hence the decision to allow Xi a third term if necessary.

The Western conclusion that this makes Xi ‘president for life’ and the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao is diametrically wrong. Xi does not have the power to unilaterally implement his agenda or to remain in power indefinitely. His repression of opponents does not prove his invincibility; it reflects his vulnerability. His many titles reflect insecurity. Deng Xiaoping, confident of power, governed China as honorary chairman of the Bridge Players’ Society.

Xi’s dilemma is reflected in his inability or unwillingness to make strategic decisions. He advocates rule of law but strengthens the Party commission that decides verdicts. He advocates marketisation of state enterprises but strengthens Party committees’ control of business decisions in both state and private enterprises. Faced with a choice between rapid reform with much slower growth, or rapid growth with much slower reform, he promises both rapid growth and rapid reform. This is more Theresa May than Mao Zedong.

The Asian miracle economies all began as repressive, authoritarian polities and extremely centralised economies. (My emphasis. Could Fiji be the same?) 

Success made these economies and polities so complex that overcentralised rule became unsustainable. In Taiwan, Jiang Jingguo, who was president in 1978–88, recognised the necessity for change, overcame his ruthless Leninist history and engineered a gradual economic and political transition. In South Korea, Park Chung-hee tried to push back the tide during his presidency, so the country’s transition began with his assassination in 1979 by a close colleague who understood the need for change.

China’s current leadership has acknowledged the new economic environment more explicitly and has planned more brilliantly than any predecessor, but politics is inhibiting economic reform. Xi is trying to marry Jiang Jingguo’s economics to Park Chung-hee’s politics. But trying to subdue the political tide creates a cycle of destructive repression.

Xi is vulnerable. He disappears from the media for days. An adulatory movie is suddenly curtailed. Portraits are suddenly removed. His bodyguards are suddenly changed. Lawyers and students are increasingly assertive. The annual Beidahe leadership meeting is contentious.

This is the opposite of an omnipotent president for life running an economy inexorably destined for rapid growth. US policies based on that false premise lead Washington to declare defeat for its policy of engagement, declare China a fearsome national security enemy and launch desperate economic warfare against the presumed superior economic prospects of China’s politicised economy. Sad.

Washington would benefit from more confidence in the free enterprise system and more perspective on China’s political dilemma. Trump’s fear of the Made in China 2025 policy reprises needless US fears of being swamped by Japan’s fearsome industrial policy in the 1970s–80s.

Likewise, the US policy of engagement has not failed. It has created the anticipated social and political pluralism. China can continue its cycle of self-destructive repression at the possible cost of interrupting its rise, it can democratise, or it can find a new way to channel the tide of pluralism. Critics of the engagement policy understand neither the time required for change in China’s vast society nor the reality beneath Xi’s adulatory headlines.

***
My comment: Fiji again?