Why the Roadmap? The Politics under the Bridges Part I

By Crosbie Walsh

The Roadmap for Democracy and Sustainable Socio-Economic Development 2009-2014 was approved by Cabinet not long after the Abrogation of the 1997 Constitition in April 2009 and I think the two events were related. 

The 2009 Roadmap, however, was not Fiji's first. A Roadmap for the Return to Parliamentary Democracy was announced by Bainimarama in February 2007, barely two months after the December 2006 Coup. This earlier Roadmap focused on economic recovery, stabilising government finances, keeping national debt within 2% of GDP, restructuring the the sugar industry, reviving tourism and proper land use planning, resolving the land lease issue, creating more jobs, better incomes and less poverty. Some progress was made on the land and leases issue but few if any of the other goals were achieved. Government had underestimated the difficulties, made no allowance for the negative effects of the Coup (which saw aid and loan moneys dry up and key civilians unwilling to take up senior positions); disastrous floods and a hurricane, and the Global Recession, and overestimated their ability to “go it alone.”

The early Roadmap also stated that Fiji would be “ready for a general election and full restoration of parliamentary democracy as early as 2010.” Some progress was made. A census was held in 2007 to obtain up-to-date figures on population location and a boundaries commission was tasked to draw up new open seat constituency boundaries and to ensure that the number of voters in each electorate was as close as reasonably practicable. If I remember correctly, former prime ministers Qarase and Chaudhry were included in discussions.

The reasons Bainimarama gave for the 2006 Coup were his opposition to three laws proposed by the Qarase SDL-led government: the Reconciliation,Tolerance and Unity Bill that would have forgiven the perpetrators of the May 2000 Speight Coup and the Mutiny in November of the same year when soldiers died and Bainimarama nearly lost his life; the Qoliqoli Bill that would have confirmed exclusive ethnic Fijian ownership of Fiji's foreshores, and the Land Tribunal Bill. Former members of the extreme nationalist Conservative Alliance Matanitu Vanua or CAMV party who, after the 2001 election, became Cabinet Ministers in the Qarase government were behind these bills that were widely opposed by moderate opinion in Fiji. Corruption had also increased under the Qarase government, and Bainimarama won early support for his declared “Clean Up campaign” and actions to decrease crime.

During 2007 and 2008 Mahendra Chaudhry was a member of Government, thus wining the support for government by the Fiji Labour Party; the draft People's Charter was announced, and the High Court found that the President had emergency powers and was correct in dismissed the Qarase government and inviting Bainimarama to form an interim government.

Everything seemed to be going well for Government but again Bainimarama had underestimated the difficulties. The Law Society, the Methodist Church, the Great Council of Chiefs, the media, the former political parties (and Chaudhry when he left government) continued to obstruct and oppose his every move demanding an immediate “return to democracy” — and, of course, Australia and New Zealand were active in isolating Fiji and in turning off the aid and loans tap, making economic recovery more difficult. The final blow came when in April 2009 when the Appeals Court ruled the President did not possess emergency powers under the 1997 Constitution which made the Bainimarama Government illegal.

April 2009: the Great Divide when everything turned pear-shape

I think it was at this point that Bainimarama (and at least some members of Cabinet) finally realized they could not implement the People's Charter and bring about the major changes they sought by operating within the 1997 Constitution, by tinkering with notions of wide dialogue, and by having early elections.  Much more needed to be done to "win the hearts and minds" of the people, and this would take time.

To accept the Appeals Court ruling would have been to accept the return of the old regime. Nothing would have been gained from the coup. Fiji would remain racially divided and there was every likelihood the extreme nationalism and fundamentalist Christianity of the former CAMV party would again have legislative influence. Nothing would be done to address land issues, poverty or corruption, and the decrees already passed would be nullified. The guiding principles of the eleven pillars of the People's Charter would count for nothing and race would again have become the divisive driving force in Fiji politics.

All observers agree that in April 2009 the old political parties, racist elements in the Methodist Church, some ethnic Fijian elite, and chiefs anxious to retain their power and privileges still exercised a sufficiently strong influence over ordinary ethnic Fijians in towns and villages that most would have voted as they were instructed. The ever-handy race card would have been played and most Indo-Fijians would also have voted on racial grounds. Bainimarama therefore probably realized he had a stark choice, a middle way was not possible.  He had either to abandon the work and goals of his government or proceed unashamedly as a benevolent dictatorship, preparing the road more slowly to parliamentary government and a more democratic Fiji. He chose the latter.

I think this is the context within which we should see and assess his actions since the April 2009 court decision whether or not we agree with his choice, or the ways in which he has enforced his wishes. To proceed, he had to persuade the President to Abrogate the Constitution, reinstate his government and approve the Public Emergency Regulations that limited rights of assembly and media freedom.

In doing so, Bainimarama refused to accept the Appeals Court decision and reverted to the original High Court decision that gave the President emergency powers and the Bainimarama Government legitimacy. He did, however, have another possible claim to legitimacy if public approval of the People's Charter could be considered a referendum.

Legitimacy and the Charter

The Charter initiative, launched in September 2007, involved a reasonably representative 45-member council (NCBBF) that produced the draft Charter. Some 250,000 copies of the draft were published in English and the vernacular, and widely disseminated. Approximately 65% of eligible voters stated they agreed with the Charter and although this figure is disputed because army personnel were involved in collecting signatures, it can be equally argued that the number would have been much greater had it not been so actively opposed by the SDL, Methodist Church hierarchy and some high chiefs. Now, three years later, with the Charter explained and church and chiefs silenced, all 14 Provincial Councils have approved its provisions.

One might also add that  Fiji is the only country where citizens can ring the PM's office with a complaint and expect the complaint to be promptly addressed. Many villagers have also commented that Bainimarama is the first PM to visit their village and listen to their complaints. This must count something towards acceptability and good governance.

The Abrogation of the Constitution had one further consequence. Judicial and some other appointments made under the Constitution became null and void, and those holding these positions found themselves without a job. Some observers said they were sacked which is not strictly true but it did give Bainimarama the opportunity to not reappoint those who opposed his government. For the most part, though, most had their licence to practice renewed and the judiciary has continued to function independently.

Developments since April 2009: Getting on with the job

Since April 2009 there have been three major developments. First, Government has for the time being largely turned its back on consultation and dialogue other than with people who agree with its aims. Its reason is that the type of “politics” previously evident in Fiji was the cause of many deep-set problems, and would distract from, and add nothing to, its reforms  It has also sought to silence, control or marginalise individuals and organizations that oppose its work. The marginalisation of the Law Society, the cancellation of the annual Methodist Church conference, the suspension of the Great Council of Chiefs and aspects of the Media decree are examples.

There are obvious concerns at this approach. Ruling by decree, the exclusion of people in the “middle ground” from decision-making processes, the assumption that government knows best and its critics are all wrong, and restrictions on the free flow of information and debate, do not bode well for a future democracy. There is always the possibility that those in power will be reluctant to give it up and that the military will retain too much influence. Civic inclusiveness is an essential part of democracy that cannot be turned off and on at will. Restrictions now will make inclusive dialogue later all that more difficult. Nonetheless, in this as in other matters, it appears Bainimarama thought he had no choice if his long term aims were to be achieved.

Secondly, government launched (but has yet to publish) its Roadmap for Democracy and Sustainable Socio-Economic Development 2009—2014 that divided the period into two: 1) Infrastructural and institutional reforms will be carried out between 2009-2012 and 2) dialogue will commence on constitutional reforms in 2012 and the new constitution will become law in 2013; dialogue will commence on electoral reforms in 2013 and become law by September 2013, leaving new parties one year to prepare for elections in September 2014. 
 

Thirdly, the Strategic Framework for Change Committee, with some public involvement, was established to ensure the work of government ministries, departments and agencies was consistent with the People's Charter and to oversee and monitor their progress on the Roadmap. All were to produce corporate plans that would be monitored by the SFCC.

Part II, that deals with  Government's Roadmap record, the issues likely to be considered in the constitutional and electoral reforms and Fiji after 2014,  will be published next Saturday.