(B) Election Formats: Part II Walsh - "New Election Playing Fields and Outcomes"

Last week I summarized two articles by Prof.Wadan Narsey on Fiji's election system, and provided links to the originals. The articles explained proportional voting and the list system which seem likely to replace the AV system used in Fiji's 2006 election. Using the 2006 election results, Wadan showed that irrespective of the system used (AV or proportional representation), the SDL would have been elected and Indo-Fiians were not under-represented by either system. The only difference was that the "fairer" proportional voting system would have seen two minor parties, the NFP and NAP, win 5 and 3 parliamentary seats respectively.

In Part II I comment on Wadan's articles, the NCBBF election proposals, the importance of the "split vote", the abolition of communal seats and ethnic minorities, Independent candidates, the number and size of constituencies, open and closed party lists, minimum votes needed to win a seat in parliament, and (thanks to notes by Ranjit Singh) on useful lessons from New Zealand's experience with its proportional and party list election system.



2006 and 2014: Different Playing Fields
I have no argument with the main conclusions reached in Wadan's hypothetical 2006 analysis so long as they are limited to 2006. They are unlikely to have any relevance to future elections held under a different electoral system that greatly reduces the influence of race on election results.

It seems likely that the new system will be based on the draft recommendations of the NCBBF.* The race-based communal seats will be abolished (or greatly reduced in number); a proportional/party list system will be introduced; there will be a relatively small number of large constituencies (5 was suggested); and each voter will have two votes, and so be able to "split" their votes between a constituency candidate of one party and a party different from the candidate's party. This last provision is very important because voters they will be able to vote for their another constituency candidate when they know their preferred candidate has no chance of winning, but vote for their preferred candidate's party -- or any other party -- with their party list vote.

If anything close to these recommended changes is introduced, the whole playing field also changes, and with it, the likely composition of political parties, their policy platform, their choice of candidates, their appeal to different sections of the public, and the cross-party alliances likely to be formed. Over time genuinely multi-racial political parties are likely to be formed from -- and between -- interest groups such as workers, farmers, business people, trade unions, the middle class, or rural and urban communities. Parties will differ in their policies, not in their racial composition.

Is the Abolition of Communal Seats a Problem for Minorities?
The proposed abolition of communal seats could pose a problem for minority ethnic groups that were previously assured three seats (Rotumans 1; General Voters 3) but if the New Zealand experience is anything to go by, proportional representation has resulted in greater representation of ethnic minorities. Six MPs are of Asian descent: a Korean, Chinese (2), an Indian, Indo-Fijian and Pakistani; and there are 4 Pacific Islanders and 18 Maori in a parliament of 120 seats. Women are also well represented with 42 seats and the credentials of MPs also seem to have improved.

Such representation occurred because parties placed minorities, women and suitably qualified people high on their party lists. Parties in Fiji could well do the same, and with a larger number of parties that could realistically expect to be represented in parliament, Independents may care to throw in their lot with one of them, or revive COIN, the Coalition of Independent Nationalists.

How Many Constituencies?
This is where I differ most from the NCBBF recommendations and agree with Wadan. The Council's recommended five constituencies is far too few because it would depersonalises the election process, and deprive voters of access to a "local" MP aware of, and responsive to, local concerns.

But I do not agree with Wadan that the number of constituencies, their unequal size, racial composition and boundaries are immaterial because, while the final composition of parliament is, as he says, decided by the proportion of party votes won by each party, each person's vote is not equal at the local level if constituencies are of vastly unequal size.

With respect to the NCBBF recommendation, I recognize that many localities, suburbs, towns and even provinces in Fiji are closely associated with one or the other major ethnic group, and constituencies so drawn would tend to perpetuate race as an election factor. This could be their reason for recommending so few seats.

However, with careful attention to boundaries, 25-30 constituencies (compared with the previous 46 communal seats), and with 41-46 list-decided seats (the equivalent of the previous 25 Open seats, making a House of 71) any party choosing to play a "race card" would have to do so very, very carefully.

The actual number of constituency and party list seats would, of course, depend on the final size of the House, which may well be less than previously. But fewer and therefore geographically larger constituencies would benefit the larger parties, and make it almost impossible for smaller locally-based parties such as PANU, and locally-known Independent candidates, with fewer resources than the large parties, to win a seat. The last thing Fiji needs is the reappearance of two large parties and the extinction of smaller parties. Coalition governments, where a large party relies on the support or one or more smaller party, tend to be more receptive to public opinion.

Open or Closed Party Lists?
The NCBBF stated a preference for "open" list seats. New Zealand has a "closed" list system. The difference is that with the open system voters rank list candidates in the order of their choice, whereas with the NZ system, each party decides its list order. Both systems have their advantages and disadvantages. With the open system voters can demote candidates favoured by their party by giving them a lower list placing; with the closed system parties can ensure the election of their most-preferred candidates, and it is this system that ensured better representation for NZ's women and minorities. In Fiji it would also ensure that the larger parties at least had their preferred mix of ethnicity, gender, skills and experience.

The Threshold?
The NZ system has one generally accepted weakness: the use of a "threshold." This is the minimum requirement -- either 5% of the party vote or one constituency victory -- that a party needs to win a seat. In the last election the threshold resulted in the ACT party with one electorate win but only 3.7% of the vote having 5 MPs in parliament, and NZ First with no electorate win but with 4.1% of the vote having none.

Fiji would be advised to have no threshold. Irrespective of whether they won no electorate seats or several, the final number of seats each party would have in parliament would be close to the proportion of party votes they won. In a parliament of 71 seats a party would need 1.41% of the party vote to win one parliamentary seat (1/71*100=1.41). This would produce a fairer result than the imposition of any minimum threshold.

In conclusion, Fiji will be better served by a proportional/party list system that reduces the importance of race, and increases the importantance of other factors that bring people together. But a larger number of constituencies than the five proposed by the NCBBF, and possibly the adoption of closed lists, would result in fairer and more truly parliamentary representation.

Most importantly, the new political system would weaken the link between ethnic nationalism, political parties and the masses on whose support they rely to win elections, or regain power by a coup if they lose. Fiji's "coup culture" may not end with the introduction of a new political system, but it will certainly make coups less appealing and more difficult to execute.


* NCBBF (The National Council for Building a Better Fiji) also recommended the abolition of compulsory voting, dropping the voting age from 21 to 18, and the abolition of the mandatory power-sharing provision that effectively destroyed a workable parliamentary Opposition.