(oB) Multiple Battle Lines
Dr Steven Ratuva
Fiji Times. October 07, 2008

[This is a "must" read because it identifies the many factions which make up the pro, anti, and neutral camps. ACW]

What we are witnessing now is not the normal ethnically bipolar political contestation between indigenous Fijians and Indians, a scenario we are used to and bored to death with, but a multi-dimensional political vortex with intersecting fault lines, never seen in Fiji's history. This has the potential either to lead to more fractures in an already volatile situation, or create a situation of calm as the competing forces reconfigure to create new alliances.

So where on earth are we heading, or rather, appear to be heading?

The indigenous Fijian anti-coup axis
No doubt the most visible fault line is between the anti-and pro-interim government power blocs. Beyond this simple dichotomy, the situation becomes murkier and outright confusing.

The anti-coup alliance consists of an array of diverse groups, some of which are even sworn enemies of each other. Perhaps the largest and most powerful group in the anti-interim Government alliance is what we may call the indigenous power bloc, consisting of the Great Council of Chiefs (the former, not the new version), Provincial Councils, Methodist Church, SDL Party and an array of indigenous Fijian groups.

Paradoxically, many in these groups supported the 1987 and 2000 ethno-nationalist coups on ethno-political grounds. However, they were opposed to the anti ethno-nationalist 2006 coup on the grounds that it purportedly undermined indigenous interests.

But things are more complicated here. Not all indigenous Fijians support the political ideology of the mainstream indigenous bloc. There are intra-communal differences in terms of interpretation of national politics as well as diversity of political interests and loyalties.

Some indigenous Fijians who do not support the mainstream indigenous power bloc are not necessarily supporters of the coup, but nevertheless are attracted by the coup's claim for non-ethnic and progressive reforms.

However, some of these people, disillusioned by the aggressiveness of ethno-nationalism and the extra-legal excesses of the military, have turned inwards and now see themselves as guardians of "impartiality" and middle of the road politics. Often this group is caught up in a complex dilemma because they are perceived as both pro-and anti-coup at the same time by both sides of the divide.

Some "moderate" indigenous Fijians have openly embraced the coup for a number of reasons such as their disdain for ethno-nationalism, potential to extract benefits from the new order, attraction of the promises of the coup reforms and the perception that the coup is irreversible anyway and "it's time to move on".

Interestingly some moderates have also joined forces with the anti-coup bloc on the grounds that the 2006 coup had entrenched the dreaded coup cycle which they vehemently detested. They were opposed to the 1987 coups, 2000 coup as well as the 2006 coup. The cycle of coups has destroyed their professional ambitions and optimism for a stable country.

Many members of the emerging and expanding indigenous Fijian middle class, many of whom were products of educational affirmative action of the 70s, 80s and 90s, see themselves as victims of the anti-affirmative action stance of the regime and have shown opposition to it.

For many indigenous Fijians, the perception that the coup was anti-Fijian has had a deeply entrenched impact and has shaped their negative attitudes towards the coup. Interestingly the Methodist Church, which is one of the most powerful institutions within the indigenous Fijian community, has cleverly indulged in political semantics, publicly branding the coup "illegal" rather than "anti-Fijian," although the latter seems closer to their hearts. This has provided the Methodist Church with the ideological and moral firepower to get back at the military, while at the same time mobilise local and international support.

Within the Fijian power bloc there are age-and newly created political fault lines which have been sharpened and given a new sense of resurgence after the 2006 coup, and more so by the Charter process. Some traditional high chiefs are supportive of the coup and some are against it.
Many of these are related by blood. The fault lines are shaped by an interesting interplay between traditional power struggle, kinship rivalry and modern power politics. Fijian politics has never been monolithic. It has always been characterised by diversity and often a mixture of power contestation and strategic compromises, from the pre-colonial era to the present.

Non-indigenous anti-coup blocs
There are other powerful anti-coup blocs outside the indigenous Fijian alliance. While it is generally assumed that the 2006 coup was "Indian-supported," the reality is much more complex. Some of the most vehement critics of the coup are from the Indian community. Amongst these are the Indian dominated National Federation Party which, although has not been successful at recent polls, still maintains its claim to represent "genuine" Indian interest; a claim which, for plausible electoral reasons, is seriously contested by the Fiji Labour Party.

Then there is an ensemble of Indian coup critics ranging from lawyers, civil society organisation activists, businessmen, academics, politicians and others. Their oppositions to the coup are based on different reasons. For some lawyers, it's simply a question of legality. Their entire professional disposition depends on being seen to be supportive of the rule of law, although some may harbour political and ideological sympathy for the coup in private.

For some Indians, the coup is a politically evilish activity which has ruined this country since 1987 and coups have to be resisted by all means and at all cost. For many Indian businessmen, coups undermine investor confidence and disturbs the business climate in a way that militates against their commercial interests. Many in this group would support any political party which promotes their commercial interests.

By and large, the legality question is an outwardly pervasive one and provides the common ground on which the ensemble of anti-coup critics stand, at least in terms of their public utterances, although their private political motives could be somewhat different. It's a morally strong ground to stand on, but the problem is that politically it does not allow for middle of the road engagement and compromise especially in this time of crisis when mutual dialogue and compromise is most needed. This is one of the reasons why we are still swirling around in a political vortex.

The pro-coup axis
The pro-coup axis could be represented as a series of concentric circles. The inner circle represents the Commodore and the military, the immediate outer circle is the interim Government, the circle outside that are the members of the NCBBF (many of these are independent with the aim of national unification) and outside that are the members of various civil groups and the general public who, for different reasons, are supportive of the coup.

As mentioned earlier, ethnic support is divided. The indigenous Fijian supporters of the coup are diverse in their justification. Some "moderate" Fijians see the coup as a vehicle to de-ethnicise the political discourse in the country as well as "cleanse" the country of what they perceive as undesirable leaders. Some, disgruntled with the developmental record of the previous indigenous governments, see the interim administration as a chance to fast track the development process by any means, legal or extra-legal.

The Indian supporters of the coup do so for a number of personal reasons but by and large are united by the promise of political salvation and liberation from perceived indigenous Fijian threat of political exclusion and domination. To many Indians (like other indigenous Fijians who suffered during the 1987 and 2000 coups), the 2006 coup was a reverse of 1987 and 2000 trend and provided just the perfect "sweet revenge."

Again, there is no single reason which makes people support the coup. Some are attracted by its initial promise of "clean up" and reform, some are lured by its anti-nationalist stance and some critics of the SDL Party see it as a good political omen. Some extreme indigenous nationalists even supported the coup because they were not happy with how the SDL maneuvered to destroy the nationalist Matanitu Vanua Party during the pre-2006 election merger.

Some have resigned themselves into believing that they must support anyone in power, as long as the services continue and as long as order prevails. Some even think that opposition to the coup could lead to instability thus the best thing to do is to support the regime and hopefully, as in past coups, things will sort themselves out.

The Chaudhry factor and de-ethnicisation
The Chaudhry factor has complicated the situation and has blurred the fault lines even more. Chaudhry's departure from the regime has reconfigured the fault lines in a significant way.

Firstly he has taken with him his Indian supporters who provided one of the initial justifications for the coup. Secondly, he has considerably weakened Bainimarama's political fortress and at the same time strengthened the resolve of the anti-coup opponents, many of whom have never liked Chaudhry anyway.

History has shown (as the Tupeni Babas, Kenneth Zincks, Atu Bains and Krishna Dutts have learnt) that whoever steps on Chaudhry's toes would eventually lose his or her own toes through Chaudhry's sharp, vengeful and Machiavellian politicking. He's an unrivalled master tactician in strategic maneuvers. Bainimarama has stepped on Chaudhry's toes, perhaps unsuspectingly, and now the Commodore needs to guard his own toes from now on.

At the time of Chaudhry's exit I predicted through the media that he was going to get back at the Commodore and even possibly link up with the anti-coup bloc. Although there is no formal alliance yet and there does not need to be one, the similarity in the political tunes of the two sworn political enemies, Chaudhry and Qarase, is slowly taking shape and an informal linkage of views is in the process of formation. The fact that these old adversaries now have a "common enemy" in the form of the Commodore is a significant twist in the quickly unfolding political episode. Ironically, this has de-ethnicised the political scene in a significant way.

The ethnic fault line which we have struggled over the years to eradicate is somewhat withering away as a result of an unintended political twist. This has reconfigured the cold war dynamics with Bainimarama on one side and Qarase and Chaudhry together on the other. But Bainimarama's job will probably be made easier by the brigade of anti-Chaudhry troops in the form of the NFP and even Labour Party members revolting against their leader.

For the first time in this country, since independence, the political fault lines no longer take an explicitly ethnic character. Have we now achieved what we have failed to achieve all this time?

The future hope?

Now that the ethnic fault line seems to be disappearing, half the job is already done.
We can then take this as point of departure to converge into a new political consensus.
As newfound accidental political twins, now Qarase and Chaudhry have a real chance to engage in their own dialogue to sort out their differences. The NFP can now be roped in to complete the multi-ethnic political equation of peace. They can then approach the interim Government for further dialogue and as a multi-ethnic group, they will no doubt appeal to Bainimarama's sense of multi-culturalism.

This process can take place informally at first and then transferred to the proposed political forum later for further engagement. Other stakeholders can then join in at this point and the process will then take its own course and dynamics, hopefully towards an achievable peaceful solution. So nobody wins and nobody loses, in fact everyone wins.

It's possible to turn a situation of conflict into peace, of disagreement into consensus, of division into accommodation, of vengeance into humility. Let's, as they say, turn swords into ploughshares.

Dr Steven Ratuva is a political sociologist at USP and these views are his own and do not represent those of the institution.