By Scott MacWilliam
There is a paradox or contradiction at the centre of relations between the military government of Fiji and the governments of Australia and New Zealand. The latter would like the Fiji military to be involved in politics only when it suits their foreign policy objectives: the RFMF* continues to see its role in nation-building, rather than occasional, instrumental terms.
In all societies there is a tension around the most desirable role for the armed forces in domestic politics: in Australia soldiers have been used to break strikes, and add prestige to governments. In the USA, the President, an elected politician is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, and soldiers have been regularly used against strikers, student protestors and any other ‘threats’ to domestic order.
It is therefore a fiction that the military stays out of politics in any country. However in Fiji, at least since 1987 the relationship between the military and domestic politics has been central and more apparent than in some countries. During the People’s Coalition Government (1999-2000) and during the subsequent Laisenia Qarase-led governments, it was obvious that the civilian authorities held office dependent upon military support. This form of militarised democracy was acceptable to successive Australian and New Zealand governments.
Once it was decided that elections were to be held in 2001, two questions were being constantly asked in Fiji and in other countries. Would the Fiji Labour Party win the most seats at the forthcoming general election? Would the military, whose support underpinned the interim government, accept an election result which produced a potential government led by deposed PM Mahendra Chaudhry? These were not just hypothetical questions, for the FLP had a more substantial electoral machine than the newly formed United Fiji Party (SDL) led by Qarase.
Before the election, a function was held to farewell a Fijian sporting team going overseas for competition. The guest of honour was Commodore Bainimarama. During the function, the subject of the forthcoming elections arose and the head of the Fiji military forces gave his view on the likely outcome of the election. His unequivocal position was that Qarase would be the PM.
News of Commodore Bainimarama’s statement travelled fast on the coconut wireless. While not unexpected, given that the military’s backing was critical for the formation and continued operation of the interim government, nevertheless the certainty of the response suggested the formation of the government after the election was what in horse racing and other sports would be termed ‘a fix’. That is, no matter how many seats the FLP won on its own or pulled together in a post-election alliance to have enough MPs to form a majority, there would be no second Chaudhry-led government.
The proposed ‘fix’ was known by the Australian government. At the time I also spoke with a well-informed New Zealand-based journalist who advised that the NZ government knew what was being proposed. In the absence of contrary evidence, it seems highly likely that both the Australian and New Zealand governments were at least tacitly accepting Bainimarama’s position. Such an outcome would give their foreign policies continuity and provide what they would regard as stability for Fiji, an elected if not necessarily majority government backed by military power.
Remarkably, including because of the fraud, vote buying and intimidation which occurred, the FLP won the largest percentage of the vote and the second most seats. The result showed those in power in Fiji, as well as the Australian and New Zealand governments, that they had been right to be concerned about a possible FLP victory. Contingency planning was justified and the RFMF’s role in this plan warranted.
In 2001, the RFMF were encouraged to support an election for which the outcome in terms of who would hold government was already resolved. Holding office through military fiat would have been acceptable, including to Australian and New Zealand governments then. So why is the Fiji military’s current insistence that it is ‘holding the ring’ until proper elections can be held so abhorrent to these governments?
At a personal level, is the ‘madness’ which Australian and New Zealand officials so regularly ascribe to PM Bainimarama that he has trouble understanding and responding appropriately to the fluctuating international expectations of the RFMF? Encouraged to place the RFMF at the centre of electoral democratic solutions on at least one occasion, but then required to play no part on another! Frank the saviour of electoral democracy in 2001, but Frank the enemy of electoral democracy in 2006 – he must be unstable!
Neither the Australian nor NZ governments seem to realise that for the soldier nationalists of the RFMF their role in the country’s future is never regarded merely as expeditious, transitory. As the current ambitions for political reform overseen by the military suggest, their nationalism is not primarily an ethnic variety. The RFMF plays a major role in Fiji’s politics because of its perceived central place in national development. The continued emigration of so many educated, skilled people increases the likelihood that, in the absence of a substantial, politically active middle class, the military will continue to be important in Fiji’s domestic politics. Instead of pushing the military only to become involved in politics occasionally, Australia and NZ might consider a longer-term strategy for making the RFMF democratic developers.
* RFMF Republic of Fiji Mililary Forces.
